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We investigate whether auditors input additional audit hours according to the sizes of book-tax differences 
(hereinafter BTD) and request additional audit fees for additional audit hours. In addition, the interaction effects of 
corporate governance on the relationships between BTD and audit hours/audit fees are examined using the total 
corporate governance (TCG) scores, data from the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS). We predict that 
since auditors have the incentive and ability to consider BTD, audit hours and audit fees will increase when BTD 
are larger. Empirical results of our study are as follows. First, BTD and audit hours (LnAH) show a negative (-) 
association that is not statistically significant. Second, audit fees (LnAF) were shown to increase along with BTD. 
This can be interpreted as a result of requests for additional audit fees for increased audit risks due to individual 
firms' BTD. Third, the interaction effect of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours 
(LnAH) showed a positive (+) association, but the association was not statistically significant. Fourth, the 
interaction effect of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit fees (LnAF) showed a 
statistically significant positive (+) association. This be understood as meaning that firms with better governance 
make more efforts for financial reporting in order to maintain their reliability in the market. This study contributes 
to the literature in several important aspects. First, it empirically demonstrates whether auditors properly reflect 
BTD on audit risks. Next, our study is analyzes the effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD 
and audit hours/audit fees using the total corporate governance (TCG) scores presented by the Korea Corporate 
Governance Service (KCGS). Finally, our findings empirically showed social proof function of accounting audits as 
a strategy to reduce information risks.  
 





his study investigates whether auditors input additional audit hours according to the sizes of book-tax 
differences (hereinafter BTD) and request additional audit fees for the additional audit hours. In 
addition, the interaction effects of corporate governance on the relationships between book-tax 
differences (BTD) and audit hours/audit fees are examined using the total corporate governance (TCG) scores, data 
from the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS). Prior research has examined the association between book-
tax differences (BTD) and measures of earnings quality and/or tax avoidance.1 
 
Financial accounting provides useful information for decision making by information users external to firms such as 
investors and creditors. On the other hand, tax accounting is aimed to provide information necessary to pay taxes 
based on tax laws to tax authorities. Thus, book-tax differences (BTD) become to occur. There are two types of 
                                                
1For example, larger book-tax differences are associated with less persistence (Hanlon, 2005), target beating (Phillips et al., 2003), lower growth 
(Lev and Nissim, 2004), and lower bond ratings (Ayers et al., 2009). 
T 
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book-tax differences. First, temporary book-tax differences are differences in the timing of accrual recognition 
between book and taxable income (e.g., warranty reserve, bad debt reserve, depreciation, etc.). Temporary 
differences provide information about the quality of pretax accounting accruals (Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010). Second, permanent book-tax differences are differences between book and taxable income that 
never reverse. Permanent differences are not often suspected to be indicators of earnings quality in terms of accruals 
manipulation because they are not related to the timing of accrual recognition. 
 
Because the possibility for managers to exercise arbitrariness is much higher in the case of book incomes compared 
to taxable incomes, BTD reflects considerable information regarding managers' opportunistic discretion on 
accounting earnings or the quality of book incomes (Palepu et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 2003). The literature on BTD 
provides evidence consistent with large BTD indicating lower “earnings quality”, which indicates information risks, 
that may result in a reduction of earnings quality. Thus, information asymmetry between the manager and external 
stakeholders will increase (Behn et al., 2008; Xu, 2010). Also, if information asymmetry between the manager and 
external stakeholders increases, resource distribution in the capital market is distorted by managers' incentives to 
increase internal transactions (Beaver, 1998). 
 
From the viewpoint of auditors, the low earnings quality of a client should mean a high possibility for the manager 
to have prepared the financial statements with an opportunistic intention and this is a factor for increases in the 
client's inherent risk. In addition, it also means that the client's accounting system and internal accounting control 
system do not act effectively. As such, ineffective operation of accounting systems and internal accounting control 
systems cannot but act as a factor for increases in clients' control risks (Lee et al., 2012). Bedard and Johnstone 
(2004) report that auditors plans for increased effort and billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation risk. 
Heltzer and Shelton (2011) conducted a large-scale survey of auditors and found that on average, auditors perceive 
all types of large BTD to be related to an increase in audit risk.  
 
In summary, large BTD increases clients' inherent risks and control risks to act as a factor to increase clients' audit 
risks, so auditors make efforts to lower the high audit risks of the clients. That is, auditors will make efforts to lower 
the audit risks by reinforcing audit procedures or expanding the range of proving procedures and consequently 
request additional compensation for the additional inputs of audit resources. Therefore, clients with large BTD are 
expected to incur long audit hours and high audit fees. In general, investors want independent auditors to remove 
intentional illegality, errors, or distortion contained in financial statements through accounting audits. In this regard, 
verifying whether auditors actually use this information in the stages of audit procedures considering BTD is 
considered as critical in proving the social functions of accounting audits. 
 
In this study, the effects of individual firms' BTD on audit hours and audit fees were analyzed using the audit hour 
and audit fee data published on the business reports of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the 
Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ) during the period 2005-2011. We predict that since 
auditors have the incentive and ability to consider BTD, audit hours and audit fees will increase when BTD are 
larger. 
 
The empirical results of our study are as follows. First, BTD and audit hours show not statistically significant 
negative (-) association. Second, audit fees were shown to increase along with BTD. This can be interpreted as a 
result of requests for additional audit fees for increased audit risks due to individual firms' BTD. Third, the effect of 
corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours show a positive (+) association, but the 
association was not statistically significant. From the viewpoint of governance, this can be regarded as meaning that 
better governance inputs additional audit hours that are necessary to improve governance. Fourth, the effect of 
corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit fees show statistically significant positive (+) 
association. This means that firms with more excellent governance make more efforts for financial reporting to 
continuously maintain their reliability in the market. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several important aspects. First, we are meaningful in that it empirically 
demonstrated whether auditors properly reflect BTD on audit risks. The assumption of this study that when BTD are 
larger, auditors will try to reduce audit risks by expanding the range of proving procedures leading to increases in 
audit hours and audit fees is considered as a study design that reflects audit practices. Next, our study is additionally 
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meaningful in that it analyzed the effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit 
hours/audit fees using the total corporate governance (TCG) scores presented by the Korea Corporate Governance 
Service (KCGS). Finally, our findings empirically showed accounting audits' social proof function to reduce 
information risks.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the study. Finally, 
section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature on Book-Tax Differences 
 
Book incomes are calculated according to the accounting standards on the accrual basis, while taxable incomes are 
calculated according to tax law provisions based on the settlement principle of claims and obligations. Therefore, 
unlike taxable incomes, book incomes are greatly affected by managers' opportunistic arbitrariness. When BTD are 
large, the managers' arbitrariness can be regarded to be large too. Previous studies have analyzed the effects of 
whether BTD and earnings management are identified and BTD on earnings persistence.  
 
Phillips et al. (2003) documented that firms that report small positive earnings have a larger deferred tax expense, 
consistent with these firms managing book income upward to meet the target, but not reporting the additional 
income for tax purposes. Dhaliwal et al. (2004) presented a study result indicating that BTD are useful in identifying 
managers' opportunistic acts of earnings management. Hanlon (2005) reports that firms with large BTD have less 
persistent one-year-ahead earnings than firms with small BTD, suggesting that investors interpret book income far in 
excess of taxable income as a “red flag” about earnings quality. Blaylock et al. (2012) show that Hanlon’s (2005) 
finding that large BTD are associated with lower earnings and accruals persistence is incremental to the effect of 
accruals on the persistence of earnings. As such, many previous studies have focused on managers' opportunistic 
arbitrariness and presented results indicating that larger BTD are associated with lower persistence of accounting 
earnings.  
 
Decreases in the persistence of accounting earnings lead to reduction in information on future profits contained in 
profits for the term. Consequently, external stakeholders have relatively more inaccurate profit expectations based 
on information regarding profits for the term (Behn et al., 2008). Therefore, as BTD increased, the information 
asymmetry between the manager and diverse stakeholders regarding future profits increases (Choi et al., 2013). 
 
Next, to review studies that verified information effects with BTD, Dhaliwal et al. (2008) presented significant 
positive(+) relationships between the variability of BTD and implied costs of equity capitals to show that higher 
variability of BTD is accepted as more negative(-) information by the market. BTD also appear to be associated with 
credit risk. Ayers et al. (2010) and Crabtree and Maher (2009) find that higher BTD explain lower credit ratings. 
 
To summarize, BTD are one of representative indicators of earnings quality and from the viewpoint of auditors, the 
fact that a client's earnings quality is low means a high possibility for the manager to have prepared the financial 
statements with opportunistic intentions. This behavior acts as a factor that increases a client's audit risk. Therefore, 
auditors will make additional efforts to reduce the audit risk and request audit fees corresponding to the efforts (Lee 
et al., 2012). Against this background, this study is intended to analyze the relationships between BTD and audit 
hours/audit fees. 
 
2.2 Literature on Audit Hours and Audit Fees 
 
As examined earlier, from the viewpoint of auditors, the low earnings quality of clients should be a factor that 
increases audit risks. Many prior studies presented results indicating that increases in audit risks lead to increases in 
audit hours and audit fees.  
 
Ji and Moon (2006) examined whether an auditor’s litigation risk affected audit hours and whether audit hours affect 
conservatism. They find that the increase in the litigation risk affects the increase in the audit hours and increased 
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audit hours due to litigation risk affects the strengthening of conservatism. Gul and Goodwin (2010) find that the 
negative relation between short-term debt and audit fees is stronger for firms with low-quality credit ratings, 
consistent with auditors pricing lender monitoring. 
 
Charles et al. (2010) examined a sample of 4,320 Big 4 client firm-years during the period 2000-2003 to examine 
the relation between audit fees and financial reporting risk (the risk of misleading or fraudulent reporting). They 
predict and find a statistically and economically significant positive association between audit fees and financial 
reporting risk. More importantly, they predict and find that the responsiveness of audit fees to financial reporting 
risk increased during the time period of their study. 
 
Lee et al. (2012) show difference in relation between designation as an Unfaithful Disclosure Corporation 
(hereinafter UDC) and audit hours according to the exchange market. Specifically, audit hours are shown to increase 
for UDC designated firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) market, on the other hand, audit hours actually 
decrease for UDC designated firms listed on the Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ) market. 
The same results are found in the analysis when the number of designation times as UDC is set as the independent 
variable. 
 
Auditors determine the level of detection risks based on clients' inherent risk and control risk. In addition, to lower 
clients' audit risk to acceptable levels, auditors set the nature, time, and range of proving procedures. If audit risks 
are high, auditors will increase audit hours inputted to reduce the audit risks and request audit fees corresponding to 
the audit hours. From the viewpoint of auditors, large BTD of clients can be interpreted as meaning that the manager 
prepared the financial statements with opportunistic intentions, and this fact will act as a factor that increases audit 
risks to auditors. This study is intended to analyze the effects of clients' BTD on audit risks. 
 
2.3 Literature on Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance is an area on which empirical studies are actively conducted not only in the field of 
accounting but also in the field of financial management. Prior studies related to corporate governance mostly 
examined the relationships between corporate governance and company values/business performance or the 
association between corporate governance and earnings quality. However, few studies examined the relationship 
between corporate governance and audit quality. Since an additional purpose of this study is to determine the effects 
of corporate governance on the relationships between BTD and audit hours/audit fees, prior literature will be 
reviewed centering on this relationship. 
 
Cohen and Hanno (2000) examined how two important macro-level risk factors affect preplanning and planning 
judgment. Their finding could have significant implications for audit practice and research. As predicted, auditors 
are sensitive to corporate governance and management control philosophy in both preplanning and planning 
judgment. Carcello et al. (2002) show significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, 
diligence, and expertise. The results are robust across numerous sensitivity tests, and they persist when measure of 
audit committee “quality” are included in the model. Abbott et al. (2003) examined the association between audit 
committee characteristics and audit fees. They predict and find that audit committees consisting solely of 
independent directors and having at least one financial expert are associated with higher audit fees. 
 
Lee and Ryu (2011) examined the association between the corporate governance improvement and audit fees. They 
find a statistically significant positive relationship between independence and expertise of outside director and audit 
fees. Bedard and Johnstone (2004) analyzed the effects of earnings manipulation risks and corporate governance 
risks on audit hours and audit fees using questionnaire surveys. The results of the study indicated that when clients' 
earnings manipulation risks were higher, more audit efforts were inputted and audit fees per hour were higher. In 
particular, the researchers reported that such results were augmented when clients' corporate governance risks were 
higher.  
 
The consensus of the literature is that, in general, when the board of directors and the audit committee are more 
independent, active, and professional, audit fees are higher and audit hours are longer. In addition, in cases where 
total corporate governance scores were used, researchers reported study results indicating that as total corporate 
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governance scores increased, audit fees and audit hours also increased. However, questionnaire surveys presented 
results indicating that when corporate governance was better, audit hours and audit fees were lower, contrary to the 
above mentioned studies. Therefore, in this study, total corporate governance (TCG) scores which are data from the 
Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS), are additionally used to examine the interaction effects of corporate 
governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours/audit fees. 
 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
Managers adjust book incomes to obtain personal gains (Schipper, 1989). On the other hand, managers' 
opportunistic discretionary power is less involved in taxable incomes because taxable incomes are recognized when 
the time of reversion of profits and loss is fixed based on the settlement principle of claims and obligations. 
Therefore, BTD reflects considerable information in relation to managers' opportunistic discretion on accounting 
earnings or the quality of book incomes (Palepu et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 2003).  
 
In particular, according to prior literature, empirical results have indicated that when BTD were higher, earnings 
quality was lower leading to decreases in the persistence of earnings were reported (Hanlon, 2005; Ko and Yoon, 
2006). In previous studies, earnings quality has been used as a measure of information risks. In this case, 
information risks refer to the risk of financial statement users' damage due to wrong decision making in cases where 
decisions are made based on distorted accounting information. Financial statement users predict future cash flows 
based on firms' reported profits and make decisions using the relevant predicted information. Therefore, low 
earnings quality is highly likely to lead to poor decision making (Kwon and Ki, 2011).  
 
Since low earnings quality indicates information risks, if BTD increases, earnings quality will be deteriorated. Thus, 
information asymmetry between the manager and external stakeholders increases (Behn et al., 2008; Xu, 2010). If 
information asymmetry between the manager and external stakeholders is aggravated, resource distribution in the 
capital market will be distorted by managers' incentives to increase internal transactions (Beaver, 1998). Meanwhile, 
from the viewpoint of auditors, low earnings quality of a client should mean a high possibility for the manager to 
have prepared the financial statements with an opportunistic intention and this should act as a factor for increases in 
the client's inherent risk. In addition, it also means that the client's accounting system and internal accounting control 
system do not act effectively. As such, ineffective operation of accounting systems and internal accounting control 
systems cannot but act as a factor for increases in clients' control risks (Lee et al., 2012). Bedard and Johnstone 
(2004) report that auditors increase effort and billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation risk. Heltzer and 
Shelton (2011) conduct a large-scale survey of auditors and find that on average, auditors perceive all types of large 
BTD to be related to an increase in audit risk.  
 
Therefore, large BTD will increase clients' inherent risks and control risks to act as a factor to increase clients' audit 
risks. Auditors will make efforts to lower the high audit risks of the clients. That is, auditors will make efforts to 
lower the audit risks by reinforcing audit procedures or expanding the range of proving procedures and consequently 
request additional compensation for the additional inputs of audit resources. According to the discussion above, we 
expect that the relationship between BTD and audit hours/audit fees can show a positive (+) association. We thus 
propose the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1a : There is a positive association between large book-tax differences (BTD) and audit hours. 
 
H1b : There is a positive association between large book-tax differences (BTD) and audit fees. 
 
There are two competing hypotheses effects of good corporate governance on audit fees and audit hours. One is the 
hypotheses that audit fees and audit hours increase when firms have excellent governance and the other one is a 
hypotheses that audit fees and audit hours decrease when auditors perceive audit risk (Park et al., 2013).  
 
First, we consider the viewpoint of firms with excellent governance. This viewpoint regards audit services as a cost 
for achieving better governance and as part of continuous efforts to maintain reliability in the capital market. That is, 
firms equipped with excellent corporate governance may prefer high quality audits to satisfy the expectation of the 
capital market that wants high quality financial information and show additional efforts for audits increases in audit 
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fees because these firms appoint high quality auditors. This viewpoint has been well demonstrated in the results of 
previous studies (Choi and Yang, 2008; Park et al., 2013).  
 
In South Korea, firms with excellent corporate governance have good financial soundness so these firms may 
require more thorough audits to maintain their good assessment in the market requiring them to pay higher audit fees 
(Choi and Yang, 2008). In previous work, audit fees and audit hours have been used as proxies of audit quality 
because researchers regarded that clients want to receive audit services from those auditors who provide high quality 
audit services to enhance the reliability of their financial statements and auditors have the incentive to increase audit 
hours inputted and receive high audit fees as compensation for the long audit hours (Kwon and Kim, 2001; Park and 
Choi, 2009; Kwon and Ki, 2011). Therefore, prior studies regard that auditors that receive higher audit fees and 
input more audit hours as providing higher quality audit services. 
 
Next, there is the viewpoint of auditors' audit risk that is contrary to the abovementioned viewpoint. The viewpoint 
regards information risks as leading to audit risks due to the information asymmetry in the imperfectly competitive 
market and if audit risks, audit hours and audit fees will also increase. Firms with excellent corporate governance 
may have systematic and effective internal control systems. If auditors utilize these systems when they establish 
audit plans, audit risks can be reduced to below the targeted level.  
 
Therefore, the characteristics of corporate governance are closely related with audit risk (Park et al., 2013). As a 
study result from this viewpoint, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) showed a result indicating that when auditors make 
audit contracts and establish audit plans, more audit efforts are inputted and audit fees per hour increase when the 
risk of clients' earnings manipulation is higher. In particular, the researchers reported that this result is further 
intensified when clients' corporate governance risks are high. When seen from this viewpoint of auditors' audit risks, 
when corporate governance is more excellent, auditors can achieve the targeted audit risk even with relatively less 
efforts because internal control systems are systematic and financial reporting systems are well established in such 
cases (Choi and Yang, 2008; Park et al., 2013). Eventually, if this viewpoint is taken, audit hours inputted and audit 
fees can be reduced.  
 
According to the discussion above, the effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit 
hours/audit fees can show either positive (+) association or negative (-) association. Based on this fact, we thus 
propose the following two hypotheses:  
 
H2a: The effects of corporate governance on the relationship between book-tax differences (BTD) and audit hours 
are not different. 
 
H2b: The effects of corporate governance on the relationship between book-tax differences (BTD) and audit fees are 
not different. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Research Models 
 
This study investigates whether auditors input additional audit hours according to the sizes of BTD and request 
additional audit fees for the additional audit hours. In addition, the interaction effects of corporate governance on the 
relationships between BTD and audit hours/audit fees be examined using the total corporate governance (TCG) 
scores which are data from the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS). We use the following regression 
models to gain insight into the effects of BTD on audit hours/audit fees. 
 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐻% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐵𝑇𝐷% + 𝛽.𝐵𝐼𝐺4% + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇% + 𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝑁% + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸% + 𝛽=𝐿𝐸𝑉% + 𝛽?𝐿𝐼𝐺% + 𝛽@𝐺𝑅𝑊% + 𝛽B𝐶𝑂𝑁% +𝛽*(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶% + 𝛽**𝑅𝑂𝐴% + 𝛽*.𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆% + 𝛽*2𝑂𝑊𝑁% + 𝛽*6𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑁% + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 +𝜀%																																																																																																																									  (1) 
	 	 	 	𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐹% = 			𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐵𝑇𝐷% + 𝛽.𝐵𝐼𝐺4% + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇% + 𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝑁%F* + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%F* + 𝛽=𝐿𝐸𝑉%F* + 𝛽?𝐿𝐼𝐺%F* + 𝛽@𝐺𝑅𝑊%F* +𝛽B𝐶𝑂𝑁% + 𝛽*(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶%F* + 𝛽**𝑅𝑂𝐴%F* + 𝛽*.𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆%F* + 𝛽*2𝑂𝑊𝑁% + 𝛽*6𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑁% + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀%  (2) 
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𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐻% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐵𝑇𝐷% + 𝛽.𝐺𝑂𝑉% + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝐷%×𝐺𝑂𝑉% + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4% + 𝛽:𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇% + 𝛽=𝑂𝑃𝑁% + 𝛽?𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸% + 𝛽@𝐿𝐸𝑉%+ 𝛽B𝐿𝐼𝐺% + 𝛽*(𝐺𝑅𝑊% + 𝛽**𝐶𝑂𝑁% + 𝛽*.𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶% + 𝛽*2𝑅𝑂𝐴% + 𝛽*6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆%+ 𝛽*:𝑂𝑊𝑁% + 𝛽*=𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑁% + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀% (3) 
    𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐹% 	 = 
	
	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐵𝑇𝐷% + 𝛽.𝐺𝑂𝑉% + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝐷%×𝐺𝑂𝑉% + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4% + 𝛽:𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇% + 𝛽=𝑂𝑃𝑁%F* + 𝛽?𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%F*+ 𝛽@𝐿𝐸𝑉%F* + 𝛽B𝐿𝐼𝐺%F* + 𝛽*(𝐺𝑅𝑊%F* + 𝛽**𝐶𝑂𝑁% + 𝛽*.𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶%F* + 𝛽*2𝑅𝑂𝐴%F*+ 𝛽*6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆%F* + 𝛽*:𝑂𝑊𝑁% + 𝛽*=𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑁% + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀%	 (4) 
 
In the case of South Korea, audit fees are determined in the stage of making audit contracts based on the audit 
client's financial data for the immediately previous year. Therefore, audit fees cannot be easily adjusted in the 
process of conducting audits. Due to this practical phenomenon, there are differences in the time points of 
measurement of dependent variables and independent variables between model (1) and (3) in which a dependent 
variable is audit hours (LnAH) and model (2) and (4) in which a dependent variable is audit fees (LnAF). However, 
in the case of the size of auditors (BIG4) and whether the audit is the initial audit (FIRST) related to auditors' 
characteristics, there are no differences in time points of measurement between dependent variables and independent 
variables in model (2) and (4). Because of the characteristics of variables, year t was appropriate for the size of the 
auditor (BIG4), the initial audit (FIRST), the complexity of business (CON), the largest shareholders ownership 
(OWN), and foreign ownership (FORN) as with audit hours (LnAH). Therefore, these variables were measured in 
year t (Kwon and Ki, 2011). 
 
Those variables that had been known to affect audit hours, and audit fees through prior literature were set as control 
variables. If the size of the auditor (BIG4) is large, the auditor will increase audit hours inputted to maintain the 
reputation of the auditor (Francis 1984; Palmrose 1989; Lee et al. 2012). Therefore, the size of the auditor (BIG4) is 
expected to have a positive (+) association for each of audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF). Prior studies 
suggest that initial audit fees are discounted due to the keen competition under the free appointment acceptance 
system. Therefore, the initial audit (FIRST) was added as a control variable. Not unqualified opinion (OPN) is 
expected to have a positive (+) association with audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) because of high audit 
risks (Palmrose 1986; Simunic 1980; Kwon and Ki 2011; Lee et al. 2012). The firm size (SIZE) and complexity of 
business (CON) of audit clients become important factors that determine audit inputs. (Palmrose 1989; Francis 1984; 
Lee et al. 2012). Therefore, the firm sizes (SIZE) and complexity of business (CON) that represents whether 
consolidated financial statements are reported were added to the model as control variables.  
 
The debt ratio (LEV) is related to long-term financial safety and the current ratio (LIQ) is related to short-term 
financial safety (Kwon and Ki 2011; Lee et al. 2012). The debt ratio (LEV) is expected to have a positive (+) 
relationship with audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF). The current ratio (LIQ) is expected to have a negative (-
) relationship with audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF). In addition, a variable that represents one-year growth 
rate in sales (GRW) was added to the control variables. Prior studies suggest that firms with high growth rate in sales 
may have high possibility of earnings management (Lee et al. 2012). When audits are being conducted, audit hours 
and audit fees are expected to increase as inventory assets and account receivables increases due to inquiry 
procedures and diligence work (Choi and Ju 1998). To control these effects, the ratio of inventory (INVREC) and 
account receivables to total assets was added to control variables. The possibility of earnings management by audit 
clients will increase when the return on assets (ROA) is low or loss (LOSS) occurred. As a result, increases in audit 
risks (Francis 1984; Blankley et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2012).  
 
With regard to corporate governance, the largest shareholders ownership (OWN) and foreign ownership (FORN) 
were added to control variable. With regard to the effects of the largest shareholders ownership on firms, conflicting 
study results have been reported. A related theory is the hypotheses of interest congruence indicating that the large 
shareholders can faithfully supervise manager. A second theory is the hypotheses of interest infringement expecting 
that the large shareholders will pursue personal gains to infringe minority shareholders' interest rather than 
supervising manager (Kim and Byun 2010). In addition, because expectations of the reliability of accounting 
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information increase when foreign shareholders share ratios are high, clients come to prefer conservative accounting 
treatment (Kim and Bae 2006). Finally, a vector of indicator variables is included to control for industry and year 
fixed effects. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
In this study, our sample consisted of firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) during the 
period 2005-2011. We obtained financial data from TS 2000 database of Korea Listed Firms Association, which 
provides the financial statements of all listed firms. For comparability, we deleted firms with non-December fiscal 
year-ends and all firms in which total liabilities were larger than the total assets. This screening procedure yielded a 
total of 3,824 firm-year observations. Table 1 shows the sample selection criteria and the number of excluded firms 
to arrive at our final sample. 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Criteria N 
Firm-year observations with December fiscal year-ends and listed on the KOSPI during the 
period 2005-2011 database of the Korea Listed Firms Association 4,920 
(Less) Firm-year observations without the audit fees and audit hours data from the TS 2000 
database (404) 
(Less) Firm-year observations without the corporate governance scores from the Korea 
Corporate Governance Service (324) 
(Less) Firm-year observations without the book-tax difference data (130) 
(Less) Firm-year observations for which financial data are not available (238) 
Total number of firm-year observations in the final sample 3,824 
 
 
4. EMPRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the major variables. The mean (median) of audit hours (LnAH) was 
6.918(6.816), and the mean (median) of audit fees (LnAF) was 11.397(11.238). The mean and median of BTD, the 
variable of interest were 0.040 and 0.016, respectively. In the case of BTD, the mean and median showed a 
difference indicating that some firms have large BTD. The mean of GOV, which is a dummy variable representing 
corporate governance, is 0.507, and this means that the samples of total corporate governance scores are 
appropriately distributed on the basis of the mean. As for the variables representing auditor characteristics, the mean 
of BIG4 was shown to be 71.1%, and the mean of FIRST was shown to be 18.5%. The mean of OPN was low at 
0.1%.  
 
As for the variables representing the corporate characteristics, the mean of SIZE was 19.877 and the mean of LEV 
was 56.1%. The mean of LIQ was 1.719, and the mean of GRW was 11.3%. The mean of CON was 69.4%, and the 
mean of INVREC was 34.7%. As for profitability, the mean of ROA was 3.1%, and the mean of LOSS was 19.9%. 
As for ownership structures, the mean of OWN was 41.7%. This shows that the share ratios of major shareholders 
including affiliated persons are high at approximately 40% indicating the governance (Park et al. 2013). The mean 
of FORN was shown to be 11.7%. The mean and the median show a big difference and this seems to be the result of 
foreign investors' intensive investments in several preferred firms (Park et al. 2013).  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N=3,824) 
Variables Mean Std. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
LnAH 6.918 0.956 1.609 6.394 6.816 7.336 10.783 
LnAF 11.397 0.839 7.496 10.877 11.238 11.775 15.150 
BTD 0.040 0.117 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.041 5.180 
GOV 0.507 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BTD*GOV 0.015 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.954 
BIG4 0.711 0.454 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FIRST 0.185 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OPN 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 19.877 1.649 15.804 18.673 19.572 20.759 25.623 
LEV 0.561 0.296 0.012 0.362 0.547 0.706 4.436 
LIQ 1.719 1.565 0.042 0.963 1.311 1.908 40.785 
GRW 0.113 0.578 -0.999 -0.015 0.059 0.167 15.556 
CON 0.694 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
INVREC 0.347 0.189 0.001 0.219 0.330 0.450 2.489 
ROA 0.031 0.133 -4.823 0.006 0.036 0.072 1.197 
LOSS 0.199 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OWN 0.417 0.164 0.023 0.302 0.414 0.518 0.935 
FORN 0.117 0.159 0.000 0.006 0.045 0.171 0.876 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the sample (3,824 firm-year observations) including the listed firms on 
the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) during the period 2005-2011. 
 
Definitions of the variables: 
 
LnAHt:  the natural log of audit hours for firm i in year t; 
 
LnAFt:  the natural log of audit fees for firm i in year t; 
 
BTDt:  the absolute value of the spread between pretax book income and taxable income for firm i in year t; 
 
GOVt:  the total corporate governance (TCG) scores which are data from the Korea Corporate Governance 
Service (KCGS) for firm i in year t; 
 
BIG4t:  l if the firm audited by a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise for firm i in year t; 
 
FIRSTt:  l if the firm is the initial audit firm, and 0 otherwise for firm i in year t; 
 
OPNt-1(t):  1 if an audit opinion is not unqualified opinion, and 0 otherwise for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
SIZE t-1(t):  the natural log of lagged total assets for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
LEV t-1(t):  total debt divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
LIQ t-1(t):  current assets divided by current liabilities for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
GRW t-1(t):  one-year growth rate in sales for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
CONt:  l if the firm reported consolidated financial statements, and 0 otherwise for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
INVREC t-1(t):  inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
ROA t-1(t):  pretax income divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1(t); 
 
LOSS t-1(t):  l if the firm reported negative net income, and 0 otherwise for firm i in year t-1(t); 
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OWNt:  the largest shareholders ownership for firm i in year t; 
 
FORNt:  the foreign ownership for firm i in year t; 
 
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation coefficient for the various combination of control and test variables. The 
correlation coefficient between audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) is shown to be 0.844 which is a significant 
positive (+) value. Audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) intended to verify hypotheses 1 and 2 of this study 
show significant negative (-) correlation with BTD. This means that when BTD are larger, less audit hours are 
inputted and smaller amounts of audit fees are requested. Contrary to the predictions by hypotheses 1 and 2, 
negative correlation coefficients appeared instead of positive correlation coefficients. Since this result is not a result 
of a multi-variate regression analysis, the correlations between audit hours (LnAH)/audit fees (LnAF) and BTD will 
be examined considering all control variables.  
 
Audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) show significant positive (+) correlations with GOV that means corporate 
governance. This result support the viewpoint of governance in relation to hypotheses 3 and 4. This means that firms 
with better governance input more audit hours to enhance audit quality and audit fees are requested in exchange of 
additional efforts. Audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) show significant positive (+) correlations with BIG4. 
This means that larger auditors are associated with more audit hours (LnAH)  and higher audit fees (LnAF). Audit 
hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) show significant negative (-) correlations with FIRST. This can be understood 
as a result of discounts of compensations for initial audits. Audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) show 
significant positive (+) correlations with SIZE. This can be understood as meaning that the size of clients plays a 
very important role as a determinant of audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF) and has significant positive(+) 
correlations with audit hours (LnAH) and audit fees (LnAF). Audit hours (LnAH) show significant positive (+) 
correlations with LEV, GRW, CON, ROA, and FORN and significant negative (-) correlations with LIQ, INVREC, 
LOSS, and OWN. Audit fees (LnAF) also show similar results. 
 
Table 3. Correlations among the Variables 
 LnAH LnAF BTD GOV BTD*GOV BIG4 FIRST OPN 
LnAF 0.8441        
BTD -0.1068 -0.0638       
GOV 0.3529 0.3929 -0.0927      
BTD*GOV 0.1442 0.1595 0.2325 0.3931     
BIG4 0.4177 0.3759 -0.0607 0.2244 0.0773    
FIRST -0.0422 -0.0812 0.0167 -0.0271 -0.0027 -0.0356   
OPN 0.0150 0.0118 0.0211 -0.0166 0.0512 0.0028 -0.0154  
SIZE 0.7088 0.7851 -0.1136 0.4362 0.1811 0.3745 -0.0619 0.0126 
LEV 0.1514 0.2027 0.1555 -0.0157 0.0670 0.0482 0.0021 -0.0030 
LIQ -0.1576 -0.1895 -0.0314 0.0277 -0.0251 -0.1099 0.0086 -0.0112 
GRW 0.0105 0.0130 0.1698 -0.0195 0.0395 -0.0040 -0.0106 -0.0199 
CON 0.2948 0.3241 -0.0291 0.0937 0.0390 0.1480 -0.0327 0.0039 
INVREC -0.1539 -0.1551 0.0588 -0.0688 -0.0232 -0.1085 0.0091 -0.0299 
ROA 0.0931 0.0597 -0.6125 0.1173 -0.0151 0.0544 -0.0075 -0.0349 
LOSS -0.0554 -0.0714 0.2043 -0.1776 0.0357 -0.0548 0.0139 0.0649 
OWN -0.1799 -0.2177 -0.0791 -0.1473 -0.0771 -0.0009 0.0130 -0.0316 
FORN 0.3393 0.3895 -0.0585 0.2799 0.1163 0.2539 -0.0492 0.0196 
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(Table 3 continued) 
 SIZE LEV LIQ GRW CON INVREC ROA LOSS OWN 
LnAF          
BTD          
GOV          
BTD*GOV          
BIG4          
FIRST          
OPN          
SIZE          
LEV 0.1555         
LIQ -0.2005 -0.4391        
GRW -0.0174 0.1677 -0.0320       
CON 0.4602 0.1650 -0.1676 -0.0093      
INVREC -0.2919 0.3947 0.0025 0.1460 -0.1110     
ROA 0.0909 -0.1695 0.0979 0.0908 0.0087 0.0532    
LOSS -0.1078 0.1229 -0.0882 -0.0624 -0.0490 -0.0824 -0.4481   
OWN -0.1140 -0.0465 0.0018 0.0093 -0.0626 -0.0026 0.0499 -0.0062  
FORN 0.4436 -0.0984 0.0633 -0.0197 0.1941 -0.1208 0.1518 -0.0984 -0.1049 
Note: This table reports pairwise Pearson correlations the diagonal for variables. Coefficients shown in bold are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed 
test). See Table 2 for all variable definitions. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
 
Table 4 provides the results of estimating Model (1) to test our hypotheses 1. Although BTD and audit hours (LnAH) 
showed negative (-) association, the association was not statistically significant. The F value of the audit hours 
(LnAH) determination model was shown to be statistically significant indicating that the setting of the study model 
was appropriate. The explanatory power (adj. R2) of the model was shown as 58.85.  
 
The control variables BIG4, SIZE, LEV, INVREC, ROA, and LOSS show significant positive (+) relationships with 
audit hours (LnAH) while the control variables CON and OWN show significant negative (-) relationships with audit 
hours (LnAH). That is, this means that firms audited by Big 4 accounting firms, larger firms, and firms with higher 
debt ratios inputted more audit hours (LnAH). In addition, firms with higher ratios of inventory assets and accounts 
receivables, firms with larger losses, and firms with higher return on total assets inputted more audit hours (LnAH). 
In the case of BIG4, these results mean that larger auditors input more audit hours to maintain their reputation. Firms 
with higher major shareholders' share ratios were shown to input less audit hours. These results were generally 
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Table 4. The Effect of Book-Tax Differences on Audit Hours 
 
 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐻% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐵𝑇𝐷% + 𝛽.𝐵𝐼𝐺4% + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇% + 𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝑁% + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸% + 𝛽=𝐿𝐸𝑉% + 𝛽?𝐿𝐼𝐺% + 𝛽@𝐺𝑅𝑊% + 𝛽B𝐶𝑂𝑁% + 𝛽*(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶% +𝛽**𝑅𝑂𝐴% + 𝛽*.𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆% + 𝛽*2𝑂𝑊𝑁% + 𝛽*6𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑁% + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀%  (1) 
 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value 
NTERCEPT  -1.244 0.180 -6.890 <.0001 
BTD +/- -0.141 0.127 -1.100 0.270 
BIG4 + 0.372 0.025 15.180***  <.0001 
FIRST + 0.023 0.027 0.870 0.384 
OPN + 0.250 0.359 0.700 0.486 
SIZE + 0.394 0.009 43.350***  <.0001 
LEV + 0.108 0.048 2.240**  0.025 
LIQ - -0.008 0.008 -1.110 0.269 
GRW + 0.011 0.019 0.560 0.574 
CON + -0.112 0.026 -4.310 <.0001 
INVREC + 0.221 0.072 3.060***  0.002 
ROA + 0.413 0.135 3.070***  0.002 
LOSS + 0.077 0.030 2.560**  0.011 
OWN - -0.424 0.066 -6.430***  <.0001 
FORN + -0.042 0.078 -0.540 0.588 
Year Dummy Included 
Industry Dummy Included 
F-VALUE 151.87*** 
Adj. R2 0.5885 
Note: This table provides the regression estimates of the model (1) that examines the effect of book-tax differences on audit hours. The model includes year 
and industry fixed effects based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industry Codes. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, based on two-tailed test. The sample consists of 3,824 firm-year observations between 
2005 and 2011. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. 
 
Table 5 provides the results of estimating Model (2) to test our hypotheses 2. BTD and audit fees (LnAF) were 
shown to have significant positive (+) association. This can be understood that additional audit fees are requested for 
individual firms' increased audit risks due BTD. The F value of the audit fees (LnAF) determination model was 
shown to be statistically significant indicating that the setting of the study model was appropriate. The explanatory 
power (adj. R2) of the model was shown as 68.46. 
 
The control variables are generally shown to have significant relationships with audit fees (LnAF). Concretely, the 
control variables BIG4, SIZE, LEV, INVREC, ROA, LOSS, and FORN show significant positive (+) relationships 
with audit fees (LnAF) and the control variables FIRST, LIQ, CON, and OWN show significant negative (-) 
relationships with audit fees (LnAF). That is, this means that firms audited by Big 4 accounting firms, larger firms, 
and firms with higher debt ratios required higher audit fees (LnAF). In addition, firms with higher ratios of inventory 
assets and accounts receivables, firms with larger losses, and firms with higher return on total assets required higher 
audit fees (LnAF). Firms that were receiving the initial audit, firms with high current ratios, firms that were 
preparing consolidated financial statements, and firms with high major shareholders' share ratios were shown to 
have been requested for low audit fees (LnAF). These results were generally consistent the results of previous 
studies that analyzed audit hour determination models (Lee et al. 2012; Kwon and Ki 2011). 
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Table 5. The Effect of Book-Tax Differences on Audit Fees 
 
 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐹% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐵𝑇𝐷% + 𝛽.𝐵𝐼𝐺4% + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇% + 𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝑁%F* + 𝛽:𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%F* + 𝛽=𝐿𝐸𝑉%F* + 𝛽?𝐿𝐼𝐺%F* + 𝛽@𝐺𝑅𝑊%F* + 𝛽B𝐶𝑂𝑁%+ 𝛽*(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶%F* + 𝛽**𝑅𝑂𝐴%F* + 𝛽*.𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆%F* + 𝛽*2𝑂𝑊𝑁% + 𝛽*6𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑁% + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀% (2)  
 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value 
NTERCEPT  3.557 0.138 25.720***  <.0001 
BIG4 + 0.174 0.019 9.210***  <.0001 
FIRST - -0.065 0.020 -3.160***  0.002 
OPN + -0.046 0.275 -0.170 0.866 
SIZE + 0.387 0.007 55.520***  <.0001 
LEV + 0.218 0.037 5.920***  <.0001 
LIQ - -0.014 0.006 -2.380**  0.017 
GRW + 0.018 0.014 1.300 0.193 
CON + -0.073 0.020 -3.620***  0.000 
INVREC + 0.192 0.054 3.560***  0.000 
ROA + 0.185 0.099 1.870*  0.062 
LOSS + -0.015 0.023 -0.650 0.515 
OWN - -0.426 0.051 -8.380***  <.0001 
FORN + 0.181 0.060 3.010***  0.003 
Year Dummy Included 
Industry Dummy Included 
F-VALUE 231.07*** 
Adj. R2 0.6846 
Note: This table provides the regression estimates of the model (2) that examines the effect of book-tax differences on audit fees. The model includes year 
and industry fixed effects based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industry Codes. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, based on two-tailed test. The sample consists of 3,824 firm-year observations between 
2005 and 2011. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. 
 
Table 6 provides the results of estimating Model (3) to test our hypotheses 3. The interaction effects of corporate 
governance on the relationships between BTD and audit hours (LnAH) showed a positive (+) association, but the 
association was not statistically significant. This result means that corporate governance plays the role of increasing 
audit hours (LnAH) in the relationship between individual firms' BTD and audit hours (LnAH). That is, in the case of 
domestic listed firms, the effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours (LnAH) 
can be regarded as supporting the viewpoint of governance rather than the viewpoint of auditors' audit risks. 
Therefore, firms equipped with excellent governance can be regarded as demanding differentiated audits to construct 
more desirable governance accordingly increasing audit fees of auditors with high audit quality in the audit market. 
Auditors can be regarded as increasing the input of audit hours (LnAH), which is an economic resource to satisfy the 
demand of firms that want excellent governance for differentiated audits. The remaining control variables are 
generally shown to have significant relationships with audit hours (LnAH). Concretely, the control variables BIG4, 
SIZE, LEV, INVREC, ROA, and LOSS show significant positive (+) relationships with audit hours (LnAH) and 
control variables LIQ, CON, and OWN show significant negative (-) relationships with audit hours (LnAH). 
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Table 6. The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Association between Book-Tax Differences and Audit Hours 
 LnAHM = 	β( + β*BTDM + β.GOVM + β2BTDM×GOVM + β6BIG4M + β:FIRSTM + β=OPNM + β?SIZEM + β@LEVM + βBLIGM + β*(GRWM +β**CONM + β*.INVRECM + β*2ROAM + β*6LOSSM + β*:OWNM + β*=FORNM + IND + YD + εM   (3) 
 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value 
INTERCEPT  -1.061 0.188 -5.650*** <.0001 
BTD +/- -0.185 0.135 -1.360* 0.173 
GOV +/- 0.070 0.026 2.690*** 0.007 
BTD*GOV +/- 0.330 0.321 1.030 0.304 
BIG4 + 0.367 0.025 14.960***  <.0001 
FIRST + 0.024 0.027 0.890 0.373 
OPN + 0.247 0.359 0.690 0.492 
SIZE + 0.382 0.010 39.260***  <.0001 
LEV + 0.116 0.048 2.400**  0.016 
LIQ - -0.010 0.008 -1.280 0.202 
GRW + 0.012 0.019 0.630 0.530 
CON + -0.103 0.026 -3.950***  <.0001 
INVREC + 0.204 0.072 2.830*** 0.005 
ROA + 0.379 0.138 2.740***  0.006 
LOSS + 0.080 0.031 2.630***  0.009 
OWN - -0.404 0.066 -6.110*** <.0001 
FORN + -0.050 0.078 -0.640 0.525 
Year dummy Included 
Industry dummy Included 
F-VALUE 144.38*** 
Adj. R2 0.5857 
Note: This table provides the regression estimates of the model (3) that examines the effect of corporate governance on the association between 
book-tax differences (BTD) and audit hours. The model includes year and industry fixed effects based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industry 
Codes. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, 
based on two-tailed test. The sample consists of 3,824 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2011. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. 
 
Table 7 provides the results of estimating Model (4) to test our hypotheses 4. The interaction effects of corporate 
governance on the relationships between BTD and audit fees (LnAF) were shown to have significant positive (+) 
association. This result means that corporate governance plays the role of increasing audit fees (LnAF) in the 
relationship between individual firms' BTD and audit fees (LnAF). That is, in the case of domestic listed firms, the 
effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit fees (LnAF) can be regarded as 
supporting the viewpoint of governance rather than the viewpoint of auditors' audit risks. Therefore, firms equipped 
with excellent governance can be regarded as demanding differentiated audits to construct more desirable 
governance accordingly paying higher audit fees to auditors with high audit quality in the audit market (Park et al. 
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Table 7. The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Association between Book-Tax Differences and Audit Fees 
 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐹% = 	𝛽( + 𝛽*𝐵𝑇𝐷% + 𝛽.𝐺𝑂𝑉% + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝐷%×𝐺𝑂𝑉% + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4% + 𝛽:𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇% + 𝛽=𝑂𝑃𝑁%F* + 𝛽?𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%F* + 𝛽@𝐿𝐸𝑉%F* + 𝛽B𝐿𝐼𝐺%F*+ 𝛽*(𝐺𝑅𝑊%F* + 𝛽**𝐶𝑂𝑁% + 𝛽*.𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶%F* + 𝛽*2𝑅𝑂𝐴%F* + 𝛽*6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆%F* + 𝛽*:𝑂𝑊𝑁% + 𝛽*=𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑁%+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀% (4) 
 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value 
INTERCEPT  3.731 0.144 25.960*** <.0001 
BTD +/- 0.221 0.098 2.250** 0.024 
GOV +/- 0.077 0.020 3.850*** 0.000 
BTD*GOV +/- 0.101 0.048 2.410** 0.021 
BIG4 + 0.169 0.019 8.920***  <.0001 
FIRST - -0.064 0.020 -3.130*** 0.002 
OPN + -0.032 0.275 -0.120 0.908 
SIZE   + 0.375 0.007 50.460*** <.0001 
LEV   + 0.227 0.037 6.170***  <.0001 
LIQ   - -0.015 0.006 -2.640*** 0.008 
GRW   + 0.017 0.014 1.250 0.212 
CON + -0.065 0.020 -3.220*** 0.001 
INVREC   + 0.174 0.054 3.210*** 0.001 
ROA  + 0.170 0.101 1.690* 0.091 
LOSS + -0.008 0.024 -0.340 0.731 
OWN - -0.406 0.051 -7.970***  <.0001 
FORN + 0.173 0.060 2.880*** 0.004 
Year dummy Included 
Industry dummy Included 
F-VALUE 220.08***  
Adj. R2 0.6861 
Note: This table provides the regression estimates of the model (3) that examines the effect of corporate governance on the association between 
book-tax differences (BTD) and audit hours. The model includes year and industry fixed effects based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industry 
Codes. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, 
based on two-tailed test. The sample consists of 3,824 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2011. See Table 2 for all variable definitions. 
 
The control variables except for OPN, GRW, and LOSS are shown to have significant relationships with audit fees 
(LnAF). Concretely, the control variables BIG4, SIZE, LEV, INVREC, ROA, and FORN show significant positive 
(+) relationships with audit fees (LnAF) and the control variables FIRST, LIQ, CON, and OWN show significant 
negative (-) relationships with audit fees (LnAF).  
 
In summary, the effects of individual firms' BTD on audit fees (LnAF) showed statistically significant positive (+) 
association, but the effects of individual firms' BTD on audit hours (LnAH) showed a negative (-) association that 
was not statistically significant. These study results indicate that although additional audit fees are requested for 
additional audit risks due to increases in individual firms' BTD, additional efforts for audits cannot be regarded to be 
inputted. The effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours/audit fees showed a 
positive (+) association. This means that firms with excellent governance input more audit hours as part of efforts to 
reduce audit risks increased due to BTD and pay additional audit fees. That is, firms with excellent governance can 
be regarded as making more efforts for financial reporting to continuously maintain their reliability in the market. 
As a result of continued efforts for securing the reliability of audit reports to give reliability to information provided 




This study investigates whether auditors input additional audit hours according to the sizes of BTD and request 
additional audit fees for the additional audit hours. In addition, the interaction effects of corporate governance on the 
relationships between BTD and audit hours/audit fees were examined using the total corporate governance (TCG) 
scores which are data from the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS). Large BTD will increase clients' 
inherent risks and control risks to act as a factor to increase clients' audit risks. Therefore, auditors will make efforts 
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to lower the high audit risks of the clients. In this regard, verifying whether auditors actually use this information in 
the stages of audit procedures considering BTD is considered to have great significance in proving accounting 
audits' social functions.  
 
In this study, the effects of individual firms' BTD on audit hours and audit fees were analyzed using the audit hour 
and audit fee data published on the business reports of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the 
Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ) during the period 2005-2011. The empirical results of 
our study are as follows. First, BTD and audit hours (LnAH) show not statistically significant negative (-) 
association. Second, audit fees (LnAF) were shown to increase along with BTD. This can be interpreted as a result 
of requests for additional audit fees for increased audit risks due to individual firms' BTD. Third, the interaction 
effect of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours (LnAH) show a positive (+) 
association, but the association was not statistically significant. From the viewpoint of governance, this can be 
regarded as meaning that better governance inputs additional audit hours to construct more desirable governance. 
Fourth, the interaction effect of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit fees (LnAF) show 
statistically significant positive (+) association. This be regarded as meaning that firms with more excellent 
governance make more efforts for financial reporting to continuously maintain their reliability in the market. 
 
The study contributes to the existing research in three main respects. First, this study is meaningful in that it 
empirically demonstrated whether auditors properly reflect BTD on audit risks. The assumption of this study that 
when BTD are larger, auditors will try to reduce audit risks by expanding the range of proving procedures leading to 
increases in audit hours and audit fees is considered as a study design that reflects audit practices. Second, this study 
is additionally meaningful in that it analyzed the effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD 
and audit hours/audit fees using the total corporate governance (TCG) scores presented by the Korea Corporate 
Governance Service (KCGS). Finally, this study empirically showed accounting audits' social proof function to 
reduce information risks. The empirical results of this study indicating that larger BTD are associated with higher 
audit fees mean that auditors make more efforts in situations where information risks are high. 
 
Limitations of this study are as follows. First, there may be omitted variables that may additionally affect audit fees 
and audit hours. Second, the reliability of the audit hours announced in business reports may be problematic. Despite 
that the samples of audit hours and audit fees were carefully selected based on prior literature, there is a possibility 
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